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Tariffs no longer represent the most serious impediment to international trade. As the
importance of tariffs in restricting free trade has been declining, non-tariff barriers are
becoming increasingly important. The use of selected non-tariff barriers is analyzed,
focusing on anti-dumping measures, voluntary export restraints, trade related invest-
ment measures, and trade related intellectual property rights. Coming multilateral ne-
gotiations will have to concentrate on non-tariff barriers. A first prerequisite for suc-
cessful negotiations is to increase transparency of these instruments. Only if transpa-
rency is ensured, improved enforcement mechanisms can be implemented.I. INTRODUCTION*
Many industrialized countries as well as an increasing number of developing countries have
made substantial progress towards fostering allocative efficiency through sound domestic and
foreign trade politics. Privatization and deregulation during the 1980s and the gradual
reduction of tariffs in eight GATT rounds starting in 1947 aimed at gradually liberalizing the
world economy. These measures, however, may only contribute to the development of a more
liberalized environment, if new distortions are not increased at the same time. In this respect,
concern has been expressed that the decreasing importance of tariffs has been accompanied
by an increasing variety and number of non-tariff barriers (NTBs), especially those which are
imposed if specific preconditions are met.
1 The achievements of multilateral negotiations and
agreements might be offset by country-specific or industry-specific trade-restricting
measures. The protection of some sectors might have been even increased despite the
reduction in tariffs. If the rising importance of NTBs were in part triggered at circumventing
GATT obligations, the current process of multilateral negotiations would have to be reviewed
critically.
The purpose of this paper is to identify recent trends of protectionism in order to gain some
insights for future trade policy negotiations. Following this introduction, Section 2 presents
some stylized facts regarding world trade flows and the recent development of trade
restrictions at a global level. The focus is on the developments of tariffs and NTBs,
distinguishing between industrialized and developing countries. In Section 3, we look at the
use of selected NTBs, concentrating on anti-dumping measures, voluntary export restraints,
trade related investment measures, and trade related intellectual property rights.
2 In Section 4
the main findings are summarized and policy conclusions are drawn.
H. WORLD TRADE FLOWS, TARIFFS AND NON-TARIFF BARRIERS: A
STYLIZED VIEW
During the last decades the volume of trade increased on average substantially faster than
world production. At the same time, the share of exports and imports of total world trade
* This paper is part of a research project on "The Social Market Economy: Challenges and Conceptual
Response". Financial support by the Bertelsmann Foundation, Heinz Nixdorf Foundation and the Ludwig
Erhard Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. I thank Rolf J. Langhammer and Peter Nunnenkamp for
helpful discussions.
1 Recently, the term, "contingent protection" has become popular to describe the new developments in trade
restricting practices [e.g. Rollo, Smith, 1993].
2 See for a classification of NTBs e.g. Walter [1972] and for an analysis of barriers to trade in services e.g.
Peat Marwick & Co. [1986].flows from industrial countries and developing countries remained relatively stable since the
1960s. Within the group of developing countries the share of Asian countries increased, while
the share of trade flows from African countries and the Western Hemisphere decreased (see
Table I).
3
While trade flows have generally increased, a diverging pattern emerges with respect to trade
regimes. The gradual reduction in tariffs in industrialized countries was on the one hand
accompanied by more drastic unilateral liberalization of trade regimes in a number of
developing countries. On the other hand, NTBs developed much less uniformly. This will be
further substantiated in the following section.
In major industrialized countries tariffs have been gradually reduced and are now at
historically low levels. Already before the conclusion of the Uruguay Round average tariffs in
most sectors were relatively low (Table 2), e.g., the weighted average tariff amounted to 5.6
percent in the EC, to 5.4 percent in the US and 3.9 percent in Japan. These already low levels
of tariff protection will be further reduced by approximately 40 percent in five steps within
four years after the implementation of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) resulting in an
unweighted average tariff rate of 3.6 percent in the EC and the US and 1.7 percent in Japan
[Presse- und Informationsamt 1994, p. 52]. Behind the average rates regional disparities
prevail. US import tariffs against the EU are supposed to fall by 50 percent; Japanese import
tariffs even by 60 percent. The EU will reduce its tariff rates by approximately 33 percent,
against the US by 50 percent. An above average reduction of tariffs is to be expected in those
areas, where low tariff rates exist already [Langhammer, 1994].
A different trend in protection may be identified in developing countries. The gradual
reduction in tariffs in industrialized countries within the framework of GATT is opposed to
more ad hoc dismantling of tariffs in some developing countries during the last decade. A
number of developing countries with tight or significant trade and capital controls liberalized
their economies rather impressively within a short period of time. This holds for reductions in
tariffs as well as reductions in quantitative restrictions (Table 3). However, these
liberalization efforts are not binding as those within the framework of GATT. Some
countries, having had tight controls before liberalizing, may now be classified as open, such
as Argentina, Bolivia, and Ghana. Dramatic liberalization measures were also undertaken in
former socialist economies. In Poland and former Czechoslovakia, foreign trade was largely
liberalized in the beginning of the reform programs, starting in 1990 and 1991 respectively.
For a more detailed overview for the European Community, Japan, and the US see Appendix Ia-c. A
slightly different pattern might emerge, if only non-fuel trade were analyzed because trade in fuels has









































































































































































































































































































aIndustria2 countries and developing countries exports and imports do not add up to world total as a few countries, summarized in a category "country/area not specified", are not
considered. The definition of the different groups of countries has been adjusted according the 1992 definitior




Simple Weighted Tariff range
USA
Average tariffs






Raw hides and skins, leather and furskins
Rubber
Wood and cork
Pulp, paper and paperboard
Textiles and clothing
Ores and metals
Coal and natural gas (excl. 09.03)
Chemicals
Non-electric machinery
Electrical machines and apparatus
Transport equipment
Professionals, scientific and controlling instruments;
photographic app.; clocks and watches
Footwear and travel goods
Photographic and cinematographic supplies
Furniture
Musical instruments, sound recording or reproduction app.
Toys
Works of art and collectors' pieces
Firearms, ammunition, tanks, other armored fighting vehicles
Office and stationery supplies
Manufactured articles, nes
Foodstuffs
Oilseeds, fats and oils and their products
Cut flowers, plants, vegetable materials
Beverages and spirits N.


















































































































































































































* Zero rates on certain products destined for use in civil aircraft. -
 aWeighted average not available.
Note: Weighted average tariffs were calculated using as weights the 1988 imports (under ad valorem tariffs) from m.f.n.-treated countries. Tariff ranges refer to the range of conventional
tariffs.


















































































































































aWhen available, a range of tariffs was used. If not available, the unweighted average of statutory rates or
an average effective rate was used. Very high rates that applied to only one or two items were disregarded.
Charges were disregarded if they applied equally to domestic and imported goods. - "QRs include value
limitations on imports through foreign exchange allocation or
provide their own exchange. -
hrough the requirement that importers
cPercent of total imports covered by all QRs unless otherwise specified. -
^In percent of total tariff code items. -
eIn percent of total tariff code items; the restricted list covers 283
tariff lines and the banned list 818 of a total of 5355. Reductions were undertaken in both categories after
April 1991. - *In percent of total tariff code items; refers to 1989. - ^Unified tariff.
Source: OECD [1992, p. 36].In 1990 the average tariff rate amounted to 3-4 percent in Poland, in former Czechoslovakia
the average tariff rate amounted to 5.7 percent in 1992.
4
The extent of protection by NTBs is much more difficult to measure, because of lack of
transparency. Two alternative procedures have been developed: the incidence approach and
the inventory approach [Langhammer, 1993]. The first approach tries to assess the effects of
NTBs, distinguishing between sectoral and global as well as domestic and foreign effects. In
the ideal case, a checklist, similar to the one presented by the OECD [1993], would serve as a
reference framework. Although this procedure would theoretically allow for the identification
of the main distortions arising from a NTB, it remains virtually impossible to quantifiy the
effects. Beside the missing transparency of the measure itself, uncertainties about the spill-
over effects render this task almost unmanageable.
5
The inventory approach focuses on the frequency of NTBs. Besides an analysis of the
development of the number of NTBs over time, the share of trade covered by those measures
is sometimes used as an indicator for the trend in protection [see e.g. Laird, Yeats, 1990;
Clark, 1990,1992]. To assess the development of NTBs over time, the OECD has calculated
an index of trade-coverage ratios (Table 4). The analysis reveals that NTBs have either
persisted or have even increased. During the last decade, levels of NTB-protection remained
roughly constant in Austria, Switzerland and Japan.
6 In contrast, an increase of protection as
measured by the share of trade covered by NTBs is in particular visible in Canada and the
EC. Focusing on core NTBs, such as surcharges, variable levies and quantitative restrictions,
the trade coverage ratios of NTBs increased in the EC, the US, and Finland. Looking at the
major industrialized countries
7 the import coverage ratio amounted to 18.2 percent percent for
all NTBs in 1990, and to 18.5 percent for all items, excluding fuels [OECD, 1992, p. 40].
These results, however, may only be interpreted as first evidence with respect to the incidence
of protection by NTBs. In particular, two problems remain: On the one hand the number of
NTBs are not recorded officially, and on the other hand the indicator does not reveal whether
these measures are binding. Despite these limitations, the analysis supports the view that
NTBs have become increasingly important in terms of trade coverage and frequency. In some
cases this is only true in relative terms, in other cases protection with NTBs even increased in
absolute terms.
4 See for a further discussion Falk, Funke [1993].
5. See for a detailed analysis of conceptual problems related to the incidence approach Deardorff, Stem
[1985].
6 One exception is New Zealand, where protection with the help of NTBs decreased significantly.
7 The United States, Japan, Canada, Australia, Austria, Finland, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland
and the EC (twelve).Table 4 - Trade Coverage Ratios
3 of Selected Non-tariff Measures (NTMs)
b Applied by Selected OECD Countries
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aRatios have been computed using 1988 trade weights (except for the United States and the EC, for which 1989 trade weights were used). - ^The group "all selected non-
tariff measures" includes certain para-tariff
prohibitions, quotas, non-automatic licensing
measures, surcharges, variable levies,
state monopolies, "voluntary" export I
anti-dumping
estraints and
and countervailing actions, quantitative restrictions
restraints under MFA am
(including
similar textile arrangements), import
surveillance, automatic licensing and price control measures. The group of "core" NTMs excludes from the group defined above, para-tariff measures, anti-dumping and
countervailing actions, automatic licensing and important
Switzerland and the EC (twelve).
surveillance measures. -
 £'The United States, Japan, Canada, Austria, Finland, New Zealand, Norway,
Source: UNCTAD Data Base on Trade Control Measures, see OECD [1992, p. 38].The stylized overview has shed some light on the contrasting trends in protection in the area
of tariffs and NTBs. In the following, we will look at the development of selected NTBs,
concentrating on anti-dumping measures, voluntary export self-restraints agreements (VERs),
trade related investment measures, as well as trade related intellectual property rights. Special
attention will be given to the EC policy.
HI. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED NON-TARIFF BARRIERS
DJ.l Anti-dumping and countervailing actions
In principle, anti-dumping measures (ADM) and countervailing duties (CVD)
8 are GATT
consistent. According to Article VI of the GATT "the contracting parties recompose that
dumping, by which products of one country are introduced into the commerce of another
country at less than the normal value of the products, is to be condemned if it causes or
threatens material injury to an established industry in the territory of a contracting party or
materially retards the establishment of a domestic industry". On the size of the duty the same
article stipulates "in order to offset or prevent dumping, a contracting party may levy on any
dumped product an anti-dumping duty not greater in amount than the margin of dumping in
respect of such countries".
In this section we will start with a brief overview of global developments and we will then
focus on the two most prominent initiators: the European Community and the US. By looking
at the product profile as well as the country profile of ADM, we will be able to identify the
main targets of this measure.
Available data indicate a substantial increase of AD investigations since the mid-1980s of
those 26 parties participating in the Anti-Dumping and Subsidies Agreement. Since the mid-
1980s 1148 initiations of investigations have been reported. Compared to the 1985-86 period
the total number of investigations increased by roughly one third from 178 to 237 in the
1991-92 period. The United States (300), Australia (282), and the European Communities
(242) were the most active initiators of AD measures from the mid-1980s until 1992. A
number of parties for which no initiations were reported in the mid-1980s were in 1992 also
among the initiators of AD measures, including Mexico (25), New Zealand (13), India (5),
Austria (4), Japan (3) and Brazil (9) [GATT, 1993b, p. 35].
While exporters of the European Community, Japan, and the United States were most
frequently subject to initiations of AD-investigations, a number of developing countries and
economies in transition were also involved considerably. AD measures are thus not limited to
8 In contrast to ADM triggered against "below-cost pricing" practices of companies, CVD are used against
export subsidization policies of countries. In the following, the expression ADM includes CVD.influence trade relations between industrial countries, but are becoming increasingly
important in affecting trade flows between large industrial countries and developing countries
(see Table 5). As the EC and the US are among the most active initiators of AD
investigations, their country and product profile will be analyzed in greater depth.
Table 5 - Exporters Subject to Two or More Initiations of Anti-Dumping Investigations, 1985-92




























































































l.The reporting period covers 1 July 1985 to 30 June 1992.
2. Initiations concerning exporters of the European Communities and it's member States are reported as
notified. Mexico notified investigations for 1988-89 on certain products imported from the European
Communities, while subsequent notifications refer to the member State of origin of the exporting firms
subject to the investigation.
3.Countries subject to one initiation are Albania, Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Costa Rica,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Georgia, Iceland, Islamic Rep. of Iran, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Libyan Arab
Jamahariya, Macau, Moldova, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Qatar, Switzerland, Tajikistan,
Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Zimbabwe.
Source: GATT [1993b, p. 36].
Approximately one fifth of all AD initiations since 1985 originated in the EC. Although the
number of new investigations has recently declined from 43 to 13 in 1992 the Community10
continues to make frequent use of AD measures. The recent decline does not necessarily
indicate a new trend towards a less restrictive policy, as the number of measures already
fluctuated substantially during the 1980s (Table 6). The regional focus was on Asia - in
particular with 20 and 19 measures in force towards China and Japan, respectively - as well as
on Eastern and Central Europe. Most actions were taken in the area of chemicals, fertilizers,
base metals, metal semi-conductors as well as textiles (Table 7). Thus, besides Japan,
developing countries and economies in transition are the main targets of the EC AD-policy.






Findings of no dumping










































































Source: GATT [1993d, Vol. I, p. 76].
Table 7 - Country and Product Profile of Anti-dumping Measures: EC
Country Profile
























Base metals, metal semi-conductors
Machinery (mechanical,electrical,electronics)
Textiles














Source: GATT [1993d, Vol. I, p. 77].
Similar to the EC, the use of AD procedures varied in the US during the 1980s but remained
on a fairly high level. The number of newly initiated AD investigations increased from 13 in
the beginning of the 1980s to 65 in the 1985/1986 period. After a two-year decline the
number of investigations amounted again to 62 in the 1988/1989 and 1990/1991 period
(Table 8).11




























































investigations are suspended when exporters agree to eliminate injurious effects of antidumping practices,
or when other conditions under the law are met. - ''Outstanding orders at the end of the period.
Source: GATT [1992b, Vol. 1, p. 95].
Trading partners that were heavily affected by US investigations again belong to both, the
group of industrial countries as well as the group of developing countries. Exporters from
Japan, Germany, and Canada are the most frequent targets from industrial countries, while
China, Taiwan, the Republic of Korea, and Brazil are the main targets among developing
countries. In Eastern Europe, exports from Romania and Poland were most heavily affected
(Table 9). Considerable similarities are also observable with respect to the product profile.
Chemicals, textiles, machinery, and electronic products were mostly subject by recent US-AD
investigations [GATT, 1992b, p. 96].
So far, the analysis has revealed that AD investigations are not only concentrated among
industrial countries but are frequently used against exports from developing countries as well
as Central and Eastern European producers. When looking at the mere number of cases one
has, however, to bear in mind that the number of cases reflects neither the restrictiveness of
the measure nor the social welfare effects. In analyzing the general impact of AD one would
.have to distinguish between short-run and long-run effects. In the short run, consumers of the
importing country of the dumped product usually benefit from lower import prices of the
dumped product. In contrast, prices, profits, production and employment levels as well as the
market share of the domestic industry may be adversely affected if factor mobility is
relatively low. The long-run effects of dumping in the importing country depend on the
medium and long-term development of the domestic competitiveness.
9 Damaging effects may
occur if scale economies or learning effects are important or necessary R&D are not
undertaken in the domestic economy due to the adverse short-run effects [Ernst and Young,
1993].
9 Nicolaides [1990] analyzes the effects of dumping on competition in the importing country in more detail.12
Table 9 - Anti-dumping Actions Taken by the United States by Country of Export, July 1980






















































































































































Source: GATT [1992b, Vol. I, p. 96].
A fundamental source of inefficiencies of ADM stems from substantial discretionary elements
in the procedure of initiations and evaluation of dumping actions [e.g. Finger, 1992; Waer,
Vernulst, 1994]. The determination of representative prices, the definition of costs, and the
lack of transparency of AD procedures contribute to the discretionary elements of the AD
mechanism and represent the main elements of "contingent" protection [e.g. Van Bael, 1990].
As a consequence the discretionary elements may be misused for discriminatory protectionist
purposes. This may be particularly relevant for developing countries and post-socialist
economies. Some of their low-priced products compete with the declining industries in
industrialized countries. However, developing countries are often lacking the adequate
equipment to defend their interests in AD proceedings [Tharakan, 1993a].
To sum up, disputes regarding AD actions have grown substantially during the last few years.
The documented initiation of these measures is mostly confined to OECD countries. More
recently, a growing number of initiations by other countries has occurred. The initiations are
directed at industrialized as well as developing countries. Such actions are not always
consistent with GATT obligations. They may be used as an instrument of industrial policyi3 Bibliothek
ies Instituts fiir WHtw
rather than as measures that exclusively try to offset international distortions. The generally
low share of trade affected by definitive AD duties underestimates the impact of these policy
measures because cascading or downstream effects may become important [Hoekman, Leidy,
1992]. Besides the neglect of consumer interests, a number of other direct effects are among
the trade disrupting effects, e.g., on importers of intermediate goods, effects on other
exporters via possible exchange rate effects, the increasing uncertainty associated with
discretionary policy actions as well as increasing incentives for rent-seeking activities.
III.2 Export restraint agreements
In the last two decades voluntary restraints on exports have become another important
impediment to free trade. Three broad types of export restraint agreements (ERAs) may be
distinguished, ranging from heavy involvement of the governments of exporting or importing
countries to little or no involvement of the governments [OECD, 1993]. Orderly Marketing
Agreements (OMA), as a first category, restrict the volume of exports via formal agreements
between governments. In contrast, the second category and third category of agreements are
arrangements among exporting firms to limit exports. While arrangements under the second
category are sponsored by governments, the third category of agreements implies ho
government involvement. Furthermore, so-called "grey measures", such as "export forecasts",
"consultation arrangements", "prudent marketing arrangements" also tend to restrict
international competition. The presence of these informal arrangements may signal exporters
the political threat of the imposition of more formal measures to reduce the intensity of
competition, if exports increase above the implicit target [Kostecki, 1987].
In the following part, we will look at the development of VERs in greater depth. Data mainly
refer to the end of the last decade, as the GATT secretariat has not compiled comprehensive
data since then.
At the end of the last decade 289 VERs (excluding the MFA) were reported world wide, of
which the EC as an importer accounted for 60 percent. Out of the 173 VERs affecting imports
to the EC, 96 VERs were national agreements, while 77 were EC-wide agreements (Table
10).
Roughly half of the EC VERs were targeted at industrialized countries, more than one third at
developing countries and 12 percent at East European countries (Table 11). Within the group
of industrial countries and developing countries, the bulk of VERs imposed by the EC
restricted trade with Japan and Korea, respectively. One third of all VER agreements
restricted trade with Japan. Nearly half of the EC-Japanese VERs affected two sectors:
transport equipment and electronic products. Most VERs that were targeted at developing
countries aimed at protecting textiles and clothing, agricultural and food products, electronic
products as well as footwear. Two thirds of the VERs in the sector of electronic products and14
footwear restrained trade with Korea. From the 12 percent of VERs that were targeted at
Eastern Europe, six VERs affected trade in the agricultural and textiles sector and five VERs
affected trade in the steel sector.
























































Benelux (13); Denmark (2);
France (17); Greece (1); Ger-
many (2); Ireland (2); Italy
(17); Portugal (9); Spain (7);
United Kingdom (26)
United Kingdom
France (1); Ireland (1); Italy
(2); Spain (1)
Belgium (1); France (2); Italy
(3); Portugal (4); Spain (1);
United Kingdom (4)
Italy (1); Portugal (1); United
Kingdom (1)
France (5); Germany (1); Italy
(4); Portugal (1); Spain (1);
United Kingdom (11)
Benelux (3); France (3); Ire-
land (1); Italy (3); United
Kingdom (4)
France (1); Spain (1); United
Kingdom (1)
Benelux (9); Denmark (2);
France (5); Greece (1); Germa-
ny (1); Italy (4); Portugal (3);
Spain (3); United Kingdom (4)
a The September 1988 - February 1989 GATT report on developments in the trading system indicates that 96
national VERs were in force as of March 1989, most of which are industry-to-industry arrangements. Of these,
26 VERs were reported for the United Kingdom. However, the UK authorities have indicated that they are
aware of only eight such arrangements, which apply to imports of automobiles, transport equipment, and
machine tools from Japan, as well as footwear from Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Romania. They have also
indicated that two of these arrangements (forklift trucks and machine tools from Japan) were no longer
justified and would be allowed to lapse. - b Industry-to-industry arrangement.
Source: Xafa et al. [1992, p. 59].15
Table 11 - EC: Voluntary Export Restraint Arrangements with non-EC Members, March 1989
Total
Steel
































































Source: Xafa et al. [1992, p. 59].
Until recently, more VERs had been applied at the national rather than the EC level. Within a
fully integrated market, however, such national measures are no longer sustainable.
1
0 In mid-
1992, the EC and Japan reached a consensus on exports of cars and light commercial vehicles
from Japan. The former system with a variety of existing national restrictions was replaced to
EC-wide monitoring arrangements. The EC formally abolished all national import
restrictions, starting in January 1993. Japan promised to monitor the growth of exports to the
EC. In general, the market share of Japanese imports should not increase above 12.5 percent,
while lower levels were agreed upon for five restricted national markets: France, Italy, Spain,
Portugal, and the United Kingdom [GATT, 1993d, p. 71, p. 170].
According to the Community, the only two other recent examples of voluntary restraints
concern steep meet and textiles. Many of the arrangements in the area of machinery and
electrical and electronic household equipment were terminated on 31 December 1992
[GATT, 1993d, p. 73 ffj.
1
0 See for a theoretical analysis of the implications of replacing national import restrictions by Community-
wide restrictions for a similar case of quotas Gros [1992].16
GATT mechanisms realted to VERs have been largely ineffective so far. Formal
arrangements are often not challenged by competition authorities. Informal arrangements are
difficult to detect and lack transparency [OECD, 1993]. Despite the well-known costs of
VERs
1
1 it may thus be difficult to phase them out completely. National competition
authorities should focus their attention on "privately" negotiated VERs and on "industry-to-
industry" arrangements. By attacking these informal agreements and changing them into
formal agreements on a governmental basis, greater transparency and juridicability could be
achieved. Transparency is a necessary prerequisite for further multilateral agreements.
VERs may be (partly) circumvented through foreign direct investment (FDI), as long as
foreign production in the domestic economy is not counted in the VER. This suggests that it
also remains important to ensure an undistorted flow of investment capital. Trade related
investment measures have, however, become another more rece,nt impediment to unrestricted
investment flows.
III.3 Trade related investment measures
Trade related investment measures (TRJMs) are regulations and incentives adopted by
governments to influence the operations of foreign firms in their territories [e.g. Puri,
Bondad, 1990]. They encompass a wide variety of measures. One possible classification of
TRIMs is to distinguish between input and output TRIMs.
1
2 Table 12 lists and briefly
describes the most common TRIMs.
Local content requirements are the oldest and most important type of TRIMs, originating
from the Latin American automobile industry [Ebenroth, Grashoff, 1994].
1
3 They were
intended to avoid a degradation of the locations to mere assembly shops. Besides local
content requirements, stipulations concerning employment of local nationals to managerial
positions as well as limitations on equity ownership by foreign firms are among the most
frequent TRIMs [Balasubramanyam, 1991].
1
1 See for example Gandolfo [1987].
1
2 An alternative classification is based on the distinction between commodity based and factor based TRIMS
[e.g. Guisinger, 1986].
1
3 Minimum local content requirements still exist e.g. in Mexico in the car industry, amounting to 36 percent
of the final value added in the production of small cars and to 40 percent in the production of trucks and
buses [GATT, 1993c]. In Brazil, local content requirements refer in particular to government procurement
of a 60 percent level [GATT, 1993a].17
Table 12 - Selected Trade Related Investment Measures
a
Input TRIMs
Local Content Requirements (LCRs)
Laws of Similars (LSs)
Manufacturing Requirements (MFs)
Technology Transfer Requirements (TTRs)
Trade Balancing Requirements (TBRs)
Foreign Exchange Restrictions (FERs)
Maximum Import Limitations (MILs)
Local Equity Requirements (LERs)
Local Labor Requirements (LLRs),
National Participation in Management (NPM)
UsuaUy require foreign firms to purchase a specific
proportion of their inputs from local sources rather
than foreign sources.
Require foreign investors to use local substitutes for
imported inputs if a "similar" component is manu-
factured locally.
Determines e.g. the production of a specific good or
prohibits the production of selected goods.
Requires the implementation and use of a specified
production technology. It is intended to encourage
research and developments activities.
Requires that the, import volume of the foreign
investor is tight to the export performance.
Directed at constraining an investor in terms of the
amount of intermediate inputs which can be
imported. Limits the foreign exchange available to
the foreign investor. Often the investor may not use
more foreign exchange to buy foreign inputs than he
received from his exports.
Directly limits the import of specified products.
Regulates the share of equity that foreign firms are
allowed to own. Sometimes these regulations are
tied to the market orientation of foreign firms.
Regulates the participation of local employees and
managers in the foreign firm.
Output-TRIMs
Export Performance Requirements (EPRs)
Product Marketing Requirements (PMRs)
Export Controls (ECs) and Market Reserve Policies
(MRPs)
Domestic Sales Requirements (DSRs)
Remittance Restrictions (RRs)
Licensing Requirements (LRs)
Requires a specified export performance by e.g.
fixing a minimum share of production that has to be
exported or by fixing a minimum value of exports.
Regulates the relation between the host firm and the
foreign mother company. Exclusive sale rights are
fixed for the host firm to selected regions or world-
wide.
Controls or prohibits exports of specific products to
improve trade opportunities for local companies
producing close substitutes.
Requires the investor to sell a specified amount of
his production domestically. DSRs thus are comple-
ments to EPRs.
Restrict the repatriation of foreign firms profits and
the salaries of foreign employees.
Licences may be required in the area of production,
exports, etc.
aSee for a more detailed description e.g. Greenaway [1990], Maskus, Eby [1990]; Ebenroth, Grashoff
[19941.18
In contrast to AD laws and ERAs, not all TRIMs affect the value of trade flows and the
pattern of trade directly. Local content requirements, for example, may induce a number of
substitution processes in the production of goods. Employment regulations for local
managerial positions may lead to a substitution from labor intensive to a more capital
intensive production. By changing the production technology different inputs may be needed,
which in turn stipulates imports of the appropriate equipment and components. Furthermore,
all domestic regulations and incentives may alter relative prices and thus influence the value
and pattern of trade. Even if not all TRIMs have a direct impact on trade flows, they still have
an indirect impact. They thus belong to the group of trade policy instruments, although in
some cases it may not be obvious at first glance.
Welfare implications of TRIMs are more difficult to assess.
1
4 The aim of many developing
countries is to obtain maximum gains from the operations of foreign firms. Whether TRIMs
are suited to achieve this objective remains debated. It is sometimes argued that existing
impediments to free trade in industrial countries render TRIMs in DCs necessary
[Balasubramanyam, 1991]. This reasoning, however, may not appear very convincing.
Obviously, in a world free of other distortions and restrictions to trade, TRIMs itself would
distort trade and hence might contribute to a reduction in welfare. But even if one takes
account of the existing trade impediments, TRIMs are open to criticism. Theoretically,
TRIMs might be taylored in such a way that they offset existing distortions but it is highly
unlikely that this is the case in reality. Identification and measurement problems of existing
distortions render this task nearly impossible.
Notwithstanding the difficulties in assessing the incidence of TRIMs, some evidence has been
uncovered so far [see Greenaway, 1990; Moran, 1992]:
The incidence of TRIMs is concentrated in developing countries. Brazil, Mexico, India,
and Nigeria most heavily rely on TRIMs in the group of developing countries, while
Canada, Australia and Spain stand out in the group of developed market economies.
- The sectors mostly affected are mining and manufactures. In the latter sector, TRIMs are
most heavily concentrated in manufacture of cars, other high tech machinery, and
petrochemicals.
The importance and potential distorting effects of TRIMs have already been recognized for a
long time. The inclusion of TRIMs into the GATT framework was already discussed in 1981.
Massive opposition from a few developing countries led to a postponement of the issue until
the beginning of the Uruguay Round in 1986. The participating parties did not manage to
1
4 See for an analysis of their effects [Funke, 1994].19
formulate a draft treaty until the Brussels conference in December 1990, which was originally
intended to end the Uruguay Round. The final agreement on TRIMs remained behind
expectations [Langhammer, 1994]. It applies only to goods. In an appendix those measures
are mentioned which have to comply with Art. Ill ("national treatment") as well as Art. XI of
the GATT (quantitative restrictions). The enumeration in the appendix is, however, far from
comprehensive. The contracting parties are required to announce all those measures that are
not compatible with the two articles. These measures have to be phased out within two years
(industrial countries), five years (development countries) and eleven years (less developed
countries). Developing countries may, however, still continue to use TRIMs to promote
economic development (according to Art. XVIII, GATT). Besides the missing
comprehensiveness of the agreement, discretionary elements continue to exist. TRIMs will
have to remain high on the agenda of trade policy agreements [Nunnenkamp, 1993]
IXI.4 Trade related aspects of intellectual property
Patents, trademarks and copyrights are among the most common intellectual property rights
(IPR). The information supplied in inventions, ideas, and new products/processes has some
public good characteristics, which may thus require some sort of protection in order to induce
production of such a good. The protection of intellectual property allows creative agents to
get a return on investment for making available new products and new technology. The ideal
protection would ensure that innovative firms and persons may internalize the positive
external effects of their new information provided.
Despite the importance of IPRs, the desirability of protection was debated in the political
process. While many industrial countries tended to protect the creators of intellectual
properties, a number of developing countries opposed tighter protection for a long time
[Deardorff, 1990]. At first glance, the differing attitudes may be explained by the opposing
market positions. While industrial countries are typically considered as supplier of new
information with commercial and artificial usefulness, many developing countries are
primarily consumers of these goods/services. Stronger protection might thus decrease the
welfare in developing countries as the access to improved technologies would be rendered
more difficult. Some doubts exist, however, whether this static view holds in a more dynamic
perspective.
When analyzing the overall effects of extending adequate intellectual property protection, the
potential dynamic effects of such a policy have to be taken into account, including the effects
on international trade, the innovation process, implications for technology transfers, effects
on foreign and domestic investments, as well as dynamic competition effects [OECD, 1989;
see also Subramanian, 1990],20
Extending the national IP protection to foreign countries is supposed to lead to higher profits
for firms owing patent rights because foreign competition by imitation is initially reduced. As
potential profits for innovations rise, the overall incentive for innovative activities is expected
to increase. This is not only the case for already existing firms but also for new entrants. In
the first place the increased dynamism will take place in industrial countries, but in the
medium term innovation could also be stimulated in developing countries, in particular in
those that are more advanced. Even if all additional creative activity would be concentrated in
a small number of industrial countries, the availability of new products could still improve the
situation in developing countries. As long as these benefits are higher than the costs
associated with the establishment of better IP protection that requires the implementation of
appropriate laws as well as mechanisms to ensure compliance, protecting IPRs internationally
appears superior compared to national laws. If the long-run costs for a number of less
developed countries are higher than the long-run benefits, compensation schemes may be
called for.
Theoretically, a number of options existed to improve the enforcement of IPR (see Table
13). Until recently the "World Intellectual Property Organization" (WIPO) was the main
organization responsible for IPR [e.g. Butler, 1990]. Several treaties are administered by
WIPO including the two major agreements on IPR, the Paris and Berne Unions. The first
deals with industrial property (including patents) and the latter focuses on copyrights. This
system had several severe drawbacks. Not all countries were signatories to all of these unions
and treaties, thus leading to a large variety of different individual cases [Langhammer, 1994].
Further progress has recently been achieved by including the protection of IP into the
GATT.
1
5 An important achievement was that developing countries could be convinced that
they would also benefit from the integration of this issue in the GATT. In particular, an equal
treatment of domestic and foreign supply as well as the most favoured nation principle was
fixed. Furthermore, protection for six different types of intellectual property was added, such
as copyrights, goods and services trademarks, geographical trademarks, industrial design and
layout design. In addition, nearly all patents will be protected for at least 20 years, implying
that developing countries will have to adjust their national legal system to standards of
industrial countries. Developing countries and economies in transition are granted a transition
period of 5 years, and even 11 years for the least developed countries. These steps seem to
point in the right direction, although still a number of issues will have to be tackled in coming
negotiations. High priority will have to be given to ensure compliance. Although the current
1
5 See for a more detailed discussion of the different interests during the negotiations Oppermann, Baumann
[1993].21




Protect IP from violators in the home market by
enacting appropriate laws and by implementing
appropriate enforcement mechanisms (e.g. empower
adminstrative bodies, court system).
Prevent the spread of intellectual property abroad
by imposing restrictions on the exports of
technology, capital goods, etc.
Restrict imports of TRIPs-violating goods by import
controls.
Evaluation
No protection in the foreign market, positive
externalities remain, foreign countries remain free
riders, competition for the best system in industrial
countries remains.
High administrative costs to enforce the system,
vicious circle of circumventing restrictions and
increasing restrictions may develop. If restrictions
are effective, foreign countries do not gain from
new inventions. Catching-up is further hindered.
Similar to first option, high evaluation costs, easy to
circumvent.
International Negotiations
Bilateral agreements with foreign governments to
enact and enforce stricter laws
Multilateral agreement on the IP issues.
Prevents production of TRIPs violating goods, but
only in the negotiating countries. Tends to increase
transaction costs and the undesired development
towards more bilateralism.
Should help increase allocative efficiency and
reduce transaction costs. The desired level of
protection as well as appropriate enforcements
mechanisms remain open to debate.
aSee VanGrasstek Communications [1990, p. 125], own evaluations.
agreement already requires national governments to implement appeal procedures, it remains
to be seen whether missing mechanisms to cope with free-riders do not violate the existence
of the whole system [Dhanjee, Boisson de Chazournes, 1990].
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The world economy has changed substantially during the last years. Unilateral trade
liberalizations in many developing countries, the completion of the internal market program
of the EC, as well as the ongoing system transformations in Central and Eastern Europe have
created new chances for a more integrated world economy and new growth opportunities.
Whether these potential gains can be realized, not only depends on sound domestic policies
but also on future external policies of the main economic actors in the world.
Tariffs no longer represent the most serious impediment to international trade. As the
importance of tariffs in restricting free trade has been declining, non-tariff barriers are
becoming increasingly important. Several conclusions emerge:22
Measures for selective trade protection seem to be high on the political agenda. The
main protectionist instruments are not new, but they seem to play an increasing role in
influencing international trade flows.
Similar to conventional tariffs, selective trade restricting instruments reduce competition
and give wrong incentive signals. Due to their selectivity, however, trade may be
distorted significantly even if the share of trade covered by those measures is relatively
small.
The dominant players use their selective trade measures on the one hand against each
other, but on the other hand against those economies that have revealed the best export
performance during the last years. Instead of viewing the most dynamic economies as a
threat, their dynanism should be used as a potential for profit opportunities and own
potential gains in prosperity.
The increasing importance of a number of non-tariff-barriers may be partly seen as a
direct response to the restrictions imposed by the GATT on the use of traditional trade
distorting instruments. Even if many NTBs are inconsistent under the GATT obligations
in the narrow sense, it remains difficult to constrain their use. Many restrictions are
informal and do not involve a visible participation of governments. Even if government-
to-government agreements are made, complaints by one of the parties involved remain
very unlikely at least as long agreements are voluntary. These agreements are protected
because those parties that are affected most negatively, e.g. consumers, cannot complain
to the GATT.
Anti-dumping investigations have been frequently initiated against exports from
developing countries as well as against producers from Central and Eastern Europe.
Inefficiencies stem from substantial discretionary elements in the procedure of
initiations and evaluations of dumping actions. Developing countries and economies in
transition often lack the adequate equipment to defend their interests in anti-dumping
proceedings.
Voluntary export constraints are concentrated in a few sectors, including steel products,
automobiles and other transport equipment, textiles and clothing with countries that are
outside the MFA, as well as electronic products. Japanese and more recently South
Korean exporters and the EC have most frequently agreed to various export restraining
arrangements.
Trade related investment measures will become more relevant in the future because FDI
represents one way to circumvent traditional trade barriers. TRIMs may be seen as one
typical example of the vicious circle of regulations, circumventions, and new23
regulations. Quantitative restrictions such as VERs encouraged international companies
to circumvent them by directly investing in the foreign country. As a consequence,
governments may either try to regulate FDI by various TRIMs or include the domestic
production by foreign companies in quantitative restrictions. The agreement on TRIMs
may only be seen as a first step in the right direction. Escape clauses for developing
countries as well as the consideration of only a few selected types of TRIMs represent
the major weaknesses of the agreement.
The agreement on TRIPs is a major step forward, as developing countries could have
been convinced that protection of IP is also beneficial for them. It remains to be seen,
whether compliance can be ensured.
Coming multilateral negotiations will have thus to focus increasingly on non-tariff barriers. A
first prerequisite for successful negotiations is to increase transparency of these instruments.










































































































































































































































33.9Appendix Table la continued




































































































































































































































industrial countries and developing countries exports and imports do not add up to world total as a few countries summarized in a category "country/area not specified" are not
considered. The definition of the different groups of countries has been adjusted according to the 1992 definition. The EC comprises Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Germany,
Italy, and the Netherlands (EC6) in 1960, EC6 and Denmark, Ireland, UK (EC9) in 1970, EC9 plus Greece in 1980 and all 12 member countries thereafter.
Source: IMF [var. iss.], own calculations.Appendix Table lb - Japan: Level and Direction of Traded
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